Book Title: Politician in Uniform: General Lew Wallace and the Civil War by Christopher R. Mortenson; University of Oklahoma Press (January 17, 2019) ISBN-10: 0-8061-6195-7; ISBN-13: 978-0-80-616195-2. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. Maps. Pp. xvi, 283. $34.95.
Review Posted: On Point: The Journal of Army History
Politician in Uniform: General Lew Wallace and the Civil War by Christopher R. Mortenson offers a critical look at the military career of a multi-faceted man, who is most famous for having written Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ. Wallace could have been just as celebrated for his generalship, but for the opposition of several war-time colleagues. The title of this work, however, resembles a little too closely the biography of another Union general who fought along alongside Wallace at the Battles of Fort Donelson and Shiloh: Major General John Alexander McClernand: Politician in Uniform.
The book should be commended for its use of General Grant’s rarely-cited, mostly unpublished report of his military activities up to the beginning of Shiloh, probably compiled in 1864. Unfortunately, Mortenson treats Grant’s account as dependable, whereas this report continually distorted history to excuse Grant’s mistakes, and place the blame upon others, if possible.
The author notes how the “politician” Wallace did not always get along with other officers, especially West Pointers, throughout the conflict. Mortenson should have emphasized, however, that those so-called “professional” officers often sharply discriminated against the ones from civilian life. Henry Halleck and William T. Sherman, in particular, despised volunteer generals. General Grant was partial to his favorites—whether West Pointers or not—and he seemed to hold back accomplished officers like Lew Wallace and John McClernand, as they outranked some of Grant’s friends, such as Sherman and James McPherson. Mortenson dwells on the terrible relationship between Wallace and Grant, but he often blamed the former for the sins of the latter.
In describing the Battle of Fort Donelson, this book relates how a Grant staffer admitted that Lew Wallace “did save the day on the right,” but only after Mortenson had unduly castigated that general for misunderstanding and then violating Grant’s orders, for delaying assistance to McClernand, for failing to show sufficient respect and restraint, and for not embracing discipline and proper procedure. Small miscues are exaggerated into fatal blunders.
The unreliability of Grant’s unpublished report is particularly notable concerning the crux of Wallace’s Civil War career: his division’s movement to the battlefield of Shiloh. The author excoriates Wallace for the delay involved, ignoring the wealth of evidence demonstrating that the “politician” was ordered to the right of the army by Grant, which caused the problem in the first place. Wallace had accordingly taken a road known as the Shunpike to get there, but this turned out to be an unfeasible route, as Confederate tactical success had pushed back Sherman’s right more than a mile by mid-afternoon. Those agreeing that this was the destination called for in Grant’s order include Wallace and four of his subordinates; quartermaster Algernon Baxter who wrote and delivered the message; Grant staffers William Rowley and James McPherson who were sent to hurry Wallace along; division commanders Stephen Hurlbut and William Sherman; a cannoneer in the latter’s division; pro-Grant biographer Adam Badeau (whose writings Grant vetted and vouched for); and Grant’s chief staffer John Rawlins (although his stated location was the army’s right, but not Sherman’s). Several of these men did indicate that Grant wanted Wallace to take River Road, versus the Shunpike. But Grant insisted to the end that the intended destination was Pittsburg Landing, despite the obvious foolishness of sending a division down the dead end to the river, especially as William Nelson (and the rest of Don Carlos Buell’s army) would be disembarking there and marching in the opposite direction. Just because Grant made claims in his unpublished report and Memoirs, that didn’t make it the truth.
Lew Wallace’s actions in arranging the defenses of Cincinnati against a possible attack during the Confederate invasion of Kentucky are compellingly portrayed. And his crucial defense of Washington is similarly described in detail by Mortenson. Wallace’s exemplary effort at the Battle of the Monocacy helped save the national capital from a potentially devastating capture during Jubal Early’s invasion, and the author does appropriately credit Wallace. But when Edward Ord replaced Wallace directly afterwards at General Grant’s behest, Mortenson indirectly blamed this injustice on Wallace’s “past confrontations” with his superiors, instead of on Grant’s persistent favoritism and prejudice.
Although there is much to like in this biography, its inability to separate the fictions of Grant, his friends, his supporters, and his biographers lessens its historical accuracy.