Book Title: All Hell Can’t Stop Them, The Battles for Chattanooga: Missionary Ridge and Ringgold, November 24–27, 1863 by David A. Powell. California: Savas Beatie LLC, 2018. ISBN-10: 1611214130; ISBN-13: 978-1611214130. Photographs. Maps. Appendix. Pp. xvi, 176. $14.95.
Review Posted: On Point: The Journal of Army History
This short but illuminating book on the culminating engagement for the possession of Chattanooga, Tennessee, succeeds in correcting several of the fictions that have crept into the standard narrative of the battle in November 1863.
The first chapter starts with General Ulysses S. Grant’s plans for the battle, but after the beginning engagement in which General George Thomas’ army captured Orchard Knob on November 23rd. The second, well-titled chapter, “Sherman Stumbles,” properly describes that commander’s sluggish advance the next day and his premature halt at an incorrect destination—it was not “the hill specified in the order.” Chapters Five and Six on “The Fight for Tunnel Hill” and “Sherman Tries Again” provide further evidence of General William Sherman’s tactical incompetence. Despite his “ample force in hand: 30,000 or more men,” Sherman employed only a third of them and even they were engaged in piecemeal fashion.
The denouement at Chattanooga is described in a chapter called “Storming the Ridge.” Whether Grant intended that the charge against the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge—as a demonstration in favor of Sherman’s effort off to the left—should continue, at some future point, to its crest represents the most important controversy concerning the battle. Most of the evidence advanced by Mr. Powell indicates that Grant only desired the limited goal (which would have left Thomas’ men in an untenable situation). It was unexpected when they chased the retreating Confederates up the slope and off the field of battle, thereby surprisingly winning the battle.
The battle’s most-noted historians—Wiley Sword, James McDonough, and Peter Cozzens—agree that Grant did not intend the ascent of the ridge by Thomas’ troops. Sword, in fact, concluded that “Grant’s ‘diversionary’ attack on the base of Missionary Ridge was so faulty in planning, concept, and out of touch with reality as to presage a total disaster.” On the other hand, in dealing with the battle, Grant’s many biographers almost uniformly follow Grant’s Personal Memoirs in arguing that he sent the men to capture rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge preparatory to an assault to the crest. Almost no one at the headquarters post or in the chain of command that day confirmed Grant’s version.
The next chapter details General Joseph Hooker’s crucial fight at Rossville and his advance against Bragg’s left flank. These efforts happened to work in tandem with Thomas’ success against the face of the ridge. Powell correctly notes that Hooker “had no role to play in Grant’s grand scheme.” Thomas, however, thought that he should. Hooker and his men had previously been rather seamlessly incorporated into the Army of the Cumberland, and he was under Thomas’ direct command.
There’s also a chapter on the effective raid by Colonel Eli Long’s cavalry brigade from the Army of the Cumberland against the Confederate army’s lines of communication. This subject is often dealt with too briefly or not at all by other historians of the American Civil War.
Quibbles can be made about numerous small issues, such as names and dates. It’s James H. (not A.) Wilson and Morgan (not Martin) Smith—whose name was correctly written in the Order of Battle and elsewhere—while “don’t call for help until you actually need it” was actually said by Sherman on the November 24th and not the 25th (a common mistake when writing about this battle). And one can certainly argue with the author’s contention that “[a]lthough Grant and those in his camp might have oversold some aspects of the campaign, there can be no question that Grant made critical contributions to that victory.” In his after-battle report and in his memoirs, Grant did more than oversell his generalship; he fabricated a plan of battle afterwards to match what really happened. His dependence upon Sherman to win the battle was obviously misplaced, while the serendipitous successes under Thomas and Hooker had little to do with his leadership.
As expected, the helpful maps by Hal Jespersen are competently compiled, except that Cruft’s division progressed farther along the crest of Missionary Ridge on the afternoon of the 25th than illustrated on Page 82 (In reality, Cruft’s men “drove the enemy before them, completely clearing the ridge for a distance of between 2 and 3 miles, and until it intersected the column of Major-General Palmer, moving out from Chattanooga on a line at right angles to our advance”). The book includes a brief driving tour of the battlefield, an order of battle, and a list of suggested books on the Chattanooga campaign.
This volume is well worth obtaining and reading.