An aggressive George H. Thomas at Chattanooga 2 comments

Several authors like to claim that General George H. Thomas wasn’t aggressive before and at the Battle of Chattanooga. Bruce Catton, in Grant Takes Command, indicated that a skeptical Thomas was deliberate and slow to get going and liked to have everything ready down to the last belt buckle before action started. Dr. Brooks Simpson, in Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, implied that Thomas was not exactly “an aggressive fighter.” Larry J. Daniel, in Days of Glory, charged that Thomas “showed little stomach for the offensive.” Christopher Einolf, in George Thomas: Virginian for the Union, went so far as to allege that Thomas, not sharing Grant’s urgency, even wanted to remain on the defensive for another month. These complaints, however, are completely contradicted by Thomas’ actions, such as when he:

• Ordered General Joseph Hooker to concentrate in preparation for the Cracker Line operations on the very same evening, October 19,1863, that Thomas took command of the Army of the Cumberland;
• Proposed his own plans for attacking on November 8^th when Grant wanted an imprudent assault around Tunnel Hill to relieve pressure on General Ambrose Burnside in East Tennessee (Although during the later battle, it turned out that Thomas’ general plans worked and Grant’s didn’t);
• “Went to General Grant and advised against any further postponement of our movement,” on November 22^nd, when Sherman was found to be behind schedule (although Grant did not approve the proposal to begin a day early, despite his expressed desire for that);
• Attacked, captured, and fortified Orchard Knob on November 23^rd, after Grant directed him to ascertain by a demonstration the truth or falsity of a report on enemy movements;
• Instructed Hooker to endeavor to take the point of Lookout Mountain on November 24^th, after Hooker had been given no plans by Grant;
• Ordered Hooker and General John Palmer to move on the enemy’s works in front of Missionary Ridge, by pivoting on Philip Sheridan’s division (Until Grant took General Baird’s division and sent it to General William T. Sherman, who didn’t need it);
• Ordered Hooker to march for and carry Rossville Gap in Missionary Ridge on 11/25;
• Placed four divisions in line for the assault against the rifle-pits at the base of Missionary Ridge on the afternoon of 11/25; sent a staffer to General Baird indicating that it was Thomas’ wishes that he ascend the ridge; and then sent messages to General Wood to continue the ascent; and
• Ordered all of the cavalry in the department, except sufficient to guard the line of Tennessee, into East Tennessee to annoy the enemy and press him as much as possible, after the victory on the previous day.

What is more, each of Thomas’ plans that Grant permitted him to put into action was greatly successful. Grant’s plan was for General Sherman to roll down the ridge from the north, a movement that failed miserably.

As evidence of a non-aggressive Thomas, those four authors all pointed to a letter in UCLA’s William S. Rosecrans Papers from General Thomas to General Rosecrans, which they date 11/19/63. That date seems corroborated by a marginal notation on it “Rec’d 11/28.” This was just before the battle’s scheduled start, and a passage in the letter which the authors quoted sounds rather timid: “If however we can hold out for a month longer our position will be entirely secure.”

In the letter, Thomas appeared to be quite concerned about his supply situation. “Our horses however are entirely exhausted, and the R R has nearly given out. If however we can hold out for a month longer our position will be entirely secure. … I shall have the N.W R.R done by the end of the year, when we shall all be able to feel secure and certain about our grub and other supplies.” The comment on whether “we can hold out for a month longer” appears to refer more to commissary shortages rather than any military vulnerability.

And the letter contains some other matter that more than suggests an earlier date. The dateline certainly looks like “Nov 19” on first glance. But the “1” could also well be a slash or (because of the uptick on the bottom) a “b” for “Novb,” either of which would make the letter’s date November 9^th. A ten-day difference doesn’t mean much in the grand scheme of history, although it makes it harder for people to utilize this letter to unduly tarnish Thomas’ reputation.

What makes a November 9^th date extremely likely is the letter’s mention that, “Sherman has dropped the R. R on the south side of the Tennessee River entirely. has posted a strong force at Eastport. to guard that Depot. and will station the bulk of his old corps the 15. on the Nashville and Decatur R.R and from Huntsville to Stevenson.” This description did not pertain to a November 19^th date. Sherman had visited Chattanooga on November 15^th and the advance of his army was just downriver past the points mentioned in Thomas’ letter. In fact, Grant’s battle plan—in which Sherman’s four divisions held a starring role—was promulgated on the 18^th—so on the 19^th Thomas could have held no expectation that the bulk of Sherman’s Fifteenth Corps would be stationed in the rear. But on November 6^th, Grant had written how “A portion of Sherman’s army will remain on the Nashville and Decatur road until that is finished. With two railroads from Nashville I think there can be no difficulty about supplies.”

Furthermore, Thomas also stated that, “Our news from Burnside is that Longstreet is approaching him slowly but he feels secure + perfectly able to defend himself against Longstreet unless he can send sufficient cavalry to cut of[sic] his trains of supplies.” But Longstreet’s (partial) siege of Knoxville already began on November 17^th. The comment about “Longstreet is approaching him slowly” makes little sense given the chronology, but it was true on and just before November 9^th.

There are other passages in Thomas’ letter to Rosecrans that might help prove when it was written. Maybe someone can produce relevant evidence to that effect, although my review of the various items so far hasn’t found anything significant one way or the other:

• “Your letter enclosing Genl Mortons Report on the Rebel defensive works at Chattanooga was received some days since.”
• “Our work progresses slowly. You remember what a Herculean task it was to undertake to complete the defenses of this place”
• “I was in hopes after opening the road to Bridgeport on this side of the River that we would have some little relief. but I do not see that our labors have been diminished, for we have been compelled to build and corduroy the entire road from here to Kelly’s Ferry.”
• “However we have quite a good road now and have accumulated something like fifteen days rations ahead.”
• “We also have in position twelve heavy guns with sufficient ammunition to fight two battles here.” On the 8^th, Thomas did inform Halleck that, “Eight siege guns reached Brown’s Ferry this evening.”

[Page edited August 26, 2020]