Shortly after General Ulysses S. Grant captured Fort Donelson in mid-February 1862, his superior, Henry Halleck, ordered Grant’s main force on an expedition up the Tennessee River under a subordinate, General Charles Smith. Grant was to remain downriver at Fort Henry. He was certainly not, however, “virtually in arrest and without a command,” as claimed in his Personal Memoirs.
Such noted biographers as Ron Chernow, Dr. Brooks Simpson, and Bruce Catton have repeated the story of Colonel John Thayer, who supposedly called to see General Grant at this point. A tearful Grant “said mournfully: ‘I don’t know what they mean to do with me…. What command have I now?’”
The source of this account came from Hamlin Garland, one in the long line of biographers who have taken Grant’s side on issue after issue, despite clearly contradictory evidence. McClure’s Magazine lauded the “new and valuable material” that Garland found about Grant’s life and stated one reason that they chose Garland to write: “he has always loved and admired Grant.” Garland claimed that his intention was to “keep as closely to original sources as possible,” and he interviewed hundreds of people. Notwithstanding this assurance, he was dismissive of interviewees who were critical of Grant.
A different problem existed with the narrative that Thayer provided Garland. The transcript reads: “I never shall forget the expression of sadness on Grant’s face as I called at his headquarters at Fort Henry to say goodbuy[sic] before going up the river. He was compelled to witness the departure of the Army of the Tennessee which he had organized and which was now under the command of General Smith. The army which he had handled so splendidly and so successfully at Henry and Donelson. [Next paragraph] In a couple of weeks, Grant came to see Smith at Crump’s landing. I saw he was in great depression of spirits. He referred to his humiliating position and drew from his pocket a dispatch which he handed to me to read. It was a curt message from Halleck which said: ‘Why don’t you report?’ As I handed the dispatch back, I raised my eyes and saw the tears coursing down his face, as he uttered these sorrowful words: ‘l don’t know what they intend to do with me. I have sent in my reports daily.’ and then he added: ‘But what command have I now?’”
Therein lies a huge discrepancy. After having been instructed to remain at Fort Henry on March 4th, Grant had made explanations about his shortcomings to Halleck, who reversed his decision. Two weeks later, Grant was upriver and in command of the expedition. Any meeting with Thayer at Crump’s Landing—where part of Grant’s main force was stationed at this time—could not have Grant bemoaning, “what command have I now?” Thayer’s anecdote can not have happened as he described it to Garland.
More dismaying is how Garland did not let this obvious inaccuracy get in the way. His book, Ulysses S. Grant: His Life and Character, twisted Thayer’s text so that Grant was apparently left behind downriver when he complained of having no command: “One of his subordinates called to see him at Fort Henry, and was much moved by the expression of deep sadness on the face of his general. He was in great dejection. The army he had organized and led so splendidly was passing out of his hands. ‘After alluding to his position, the general took from his pocket Halleck’s curt despatch. When his friend looked up from reading it he saw tears on General Grant’s face. He said mournfully: “I don’t know what they mean to do with me.” Then he added with a sad cadence in his voice: ‘What command have I now?’”
Catton and Simpson cited Ulysses S. Grant: His Life and Character in this matter and may have been fooled by Garland’s falsehood. Ron Chernow, on the other hand, cited USC’s Hamlin Garland Papers. With the transcript—and a basic knowledge of the chronology between the Battles of Fort Donelson and Shiloh—he should have understood the utter implausibility of Thayer’s rendering. So, unless other evidence exists showing otherwise, this episode should be considered mythical.
Joseph,
What strikes me throughout this article is how closely Grant’s & Thayer’s statements parallel correspondence between Halleck & McClellan, and Halleck & Grant in the Official Records during the two week period. Halleck wires his boss McClellan that Grant’s unauthorized trip to Nashville after Donelson “demoralized” his command; “I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him”;”it is hard to censure a successful general after a victory, but I think he deserves it”. Little Mac responds he should “not hesitate to arrest him at once”. Halleck mentions the possibility of drunkenness in his reply stating that while he will not arrest Grant at this time, he will relieve him from field command & put his senior division commander General C. F. Smith in his place. To a commander in a combat zone, being removed from field command is the equivalent of having been relieved of overall command since his direct control of his army is severely limited. To Grant, Halleck again questions “Why do you not obey my order to report strength & position of your command?” and warns “unless these things are immediately corrected, I am directed to relieve you from command.”
That Grant would feel “virtually in arrest & without a command” is a logical extension from the OR’s. Also the thrust of Thayer’s dialogue seems feasible even if his time frame may be off if he met with Grant again in a week to 10 days instead of 2 weeks. Grant was restored to field command on March 14th after Halleck was promoted to overall command in the West & asked by Lincoln why he had shelved Grant.
Dan
Dan,
Yes, it’s no surprise and quite logical that Grant would have been disgruntled at this time. There are some things to remember, though:
Grant knew that he wasn’t in arrest or anything close to it. He wrote his wife on March 5, “I am in a very poor humor for writing. I was ordered to command a very important expedition up the Tennessee river and now an order comes directing one of my juniors to take the command whilst I am left behind here with a small garrison.” Grant felt justified in asking for a court of inquiry, yet he was planning to do to Ben Butler in 1864 what Henry Halleck did to him in 1862.
Halleck had some good reasons for keeping Grant back. General Grant left his command without proper authority to go to Nashville. Halleck received complaints about mismanagement at Henry and Donelson. General Charles Smith apparently agreed with Halleck, stating: “This whole force is utterly demoralized by victory.” Grant acknowledged his failure to submit consolidated reports of troop strength, and he only forwarded situation reports to Halleck’s chief of staff, George W. Cullum, approximately every other day from the fall of Donelson through the end of February. Two of the sword’s donors, John Cook and Wash Graham, had been implicated in pilfering captured goods. There is also the possibility that General Grant really had resumed his former bad habits.
To your point, however, that “the thrust of Thayer’s dialogue seems feasible even if his time frame may be off if he met with Grant again in a week to 10 days instead of 2 weeks,” that might have been the case if the two officers had been together. But Thayer was upriver, while Grant didn’t arrive at Savannah until March 17. So it doesn’t matter if Grant was placed back in command of the expedition earlier, the two individuals have to be in the same place at the same time for this story to work, and the earliest that this could have been was March 17th, after Grant was back in command. This matches the couple of weeks to which Thayer referred. And if Thayer made two mistakes in this anecdote about the place and the time, then there is no reason to credit his memory. His interview, furthermore, took place after the publication of Grant’s Memoirs, in which Grant claimed that, “I was virtually in arrest and without a command.” Thayer may just have been conforming to Grant’s assertion.
The period in question embraced March 3rd to March 13 of 1862 and Grant’s predicament erupted with Halleck’s realization that MGen Grant was not on the Tennessee River where he had been ordered; but was instead in vicinity of Fort Donelson after having returned from an unauthorized visit to Nashville (where he lorded over Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell his “new” rank of Major General.) MGen Halleck was engaged in delicate negotiations with authorities back East, attempting to gain expanded size and power to his Department. And he was attempting to smooth the way for BGen Buell’s absorption into his expanded Department. So Grant’s “bull in a China shop” sortie into Nashville had potential to reverse all of Halleck’s negotiated gains.
Halleck appears to have been alerted by Buell that, “Grant met me in Nashville.” Then there were rumors of U.S. Grant “returning to bad habits.” And there was a charge against Grant of corruption in regard to captured arms at Fort Donelson, and where those arms ended up. General Grant had made tentative plans for an operation up the Tennessee River to Paris; General Halleck expanded those plans into an expedition against Southern railroads (likely an effort to disrupt Johnston and Beauregard in their flight from Nashville) and removed Grant from field command, and installed General C.F. Smith in his stead.
Was Grant upset with this removal from field command? In Surgeon Brinton’s memoirs, he makes mention that, “On March 4th General Grant left Fort Donelson and rode over to Fort Henry, taking up our quarters on a steamer. The expedition fitted out for the Tennessee River [departed] under command of General C. F. Smith” (page 145.) And on page 148: “[On March 10th] I passed into the back part of the cabin deck, that part curtained off as the Ladies’ Saloon, used at the time as the private office of headquarters. My own stateroom was near to Grant’s, and opened into the offices of Generals Oglesby, Cook, Lawler… Several of them had been at the Battle of Belmont, and were known as his Belmont Colonels. They had just presented a Sword of Honor to General Grant, and it lay upon its open case upon the table. The General had received it when presented, but unable to answer and overcome by his emotions, he turned and went back through the cabin door on to the open deck. I was at first ignorant of what had happened, but was told… I went out on the guards, and there stumbled across the General. The tears were on his face, unmistakably. He took me by the arm, without a word, and led me back inside to the round table, on which the sword lay… pushed it, as it were, toward me, saying, ‘Doctor, send it to my wife, I will never wear a sword again.’
I believe this is the day Grant hit bottom: he had sent his second request to Halleck asking for transfer the previous day. And in all likelihood, General Grant would be assigned “someplace else” and no longer be involved with “his” army. [And this incident aboard the “Tigress” may be the event John Thayer heard about, and morphed into his own personal “recollection.” ]
Joe
Just a few more points, if I may…
“Virtually under arrest” sounds much more… dramatic.. than, “in limbo” (which was Grant’s real situation after March 3rd as Henry Halleck attempted to work through numerous complaints against U.S. Grant, no doubt hoping something would provide justification to remove Grant, as authorized by MGen George McClellan.) But, a few things happened, beginning with Simon Cameron’s removal as SecWar in January, and his replacement by Edwin Stanton. Then, on March 11th George McClellan was replaced as Commander of the Union Army (that role assumed by the team of Lincoln and Stanton.) Also on March 11 Henry Halleck morphed from Hyde to Jekyll, likely ecstatic at news that he was now in command of the expanded Department of the Mississippi, absorbing Buell’s department as requested. And probably due this euphoria (and with no good grounds to remove him) Halleck informed Grant that “his return to field command was imminent.” [We know this because General C.F. Smith wrote to Grant on March 14 and congratulated him on the news contained in Grant’s letter of March 11 – see Papers of US Grant vol.4 page 343 notes.]
This is why I believe U.S. Grant hit bottom on March 10th. He had risked everything on one roll of the dice (submitted at least two letters requesting transfer from Halleck’s Department) and came out a winner. But Grant also knew how close he had come to losing it all. From March 11th until the Battle of Shiloh erupted on April 6th U.S. Grant paid lip service to Halleck’s fiendishly petty demands… allowing many of those irksome requirements to flow past Grant, to become irritants for subordinates: “No one has authority to mess with the Furlough System” and “Colonels and Captains must be held responsible for the actions of their men” and “Do nothing to bring on a general engagement.” The rigid enforcement of “discipline” allowed Grant to ride roughshod over Lew Wallace and John McClernand, “reining in loose cannons,” but also killing any inclination of subordinates to act without instructions (Lew Wallace waiting at Crump’s for General Grant on Sunday morning, instead of taking the initiative and setting off immediately down the Shunpike towards the sound of the guns, only one example.)
Mike,
Thank you for your detailed observations concerning this episode and coincidental happenings.
On March 9, 1862, Halleck instructed Grant … “As soon as these things are arranged you will hold yourself in readiness to take the command…. I shall organize and send you re-enforcements as rapidly as possible, and when I get them under way I shall join you myself.” So, Grant should have felt pretty optimistic upon receipt of this. Two days later, Grant informed Smith that: “… Gen. Halleck telegraphs me this morning that since the signal success of Gen. Curtis in the South West, the troops held as a reserve for him, will be sent to me; and when they arrive I may take the General direction. I think it exceedingly doubtful whether I shall accept; certainly not until the object of the expedition is accomplished.” This makes the “What command have I now” anecdote even less likely.
I think that Halleck’s charges against Grant of negligence can be considered commensurate with the action he took. Several times during the war, I think that Grant did hit low points, and basically agree with you that “Grant hit bottom on March 10th,” or a few days before.