A forthcoming book posits that the “Civil War’s Most Persistent Myth” involves the existence or non-existence of Black Confederate soldiers. Yet, the Amazon description admits that it “largely originated in the 1970s.” Many myths concerning that conflict have persisted well beyond fifty years.
I would nominate a far older and much more egregious example of distorted history. General Ulysses S. Grant has acquired a sterling reputation as an officer and as a gentleman, despite suffering the biggest surprise of the Civil War, committing the worst official act of anti-Semitism on United States soil, and coming closest of all Union commanders to losing Washington. Grant’s defenders even rank his generalship above Robert E. Lee’s, but to do so, they must ignore his simplistic, pugnacious strategies that culminated in a war of attrition, as well as his amateurish tactics of impetuous frontal assaults, all along the line against fortified positions.
In almost each and every controversy, Grant’s biographers give Grant the benefit of the doubt. This is true for his drunken partying with the enemy on flag-of-truce boats on the Mississippi; condoning corruption in Cairo, Illinois; dishonestly blaming Lew Wallace for taking the wrong road to the wrong destination on the march to Shiloh; pretending that he had the plan to pass Vicksburg all along; taking credit for the unordered charge up Missionary Ridge; and leaving wounded men to suffer and die between the lines at Cold Harbor. Minimized or omitted from the standard histories are Grant’s occupation of Paducah under Frémont’s orders, the multiple blunders in and around the Mississippi Delta, the non-triumphal exit from the Wilderness, Grant’s ordering Union troops to advance over the unexploded mine (of “the Crater”), and myriad other, unfortunate episodes.
Personally brave in battle, Grant was certainly persistent on campaign, which helped him achieve victories at Fort Donelson and at Vicksburg by hedging in an inert Confederate commander against a river. Naval forces—whose impact in the war he minimized—played a crucial role at each. Grant likewise, erroneously asserted that the federal navy was “not able to keep up an effective blockade.”
His Personal Memoirs are shown to be essentially unreliable. Battle after battle is described using falsehood and distortion. Grant refused to acknowledge the services of Elihu Washburne, John Rawlins, and Charles Dana, who were of inestimable importance to his military career. Henry Halleck generally supported Grant—even covering up Grant’s being surprised at Shiloh—but was turned into an incompetent backstabber for once alluding to Grant’s alcoholism. And Grant was an alcoholic, as confirmed by his friend, Dr. Edward Kittoe, who served with him during the early years of the war. Kittoe related how “Grant was addicted to the use of strong drink during the early years of the war.”
Other defects in Grant’s character damaged the Union war effort, beyond his flawed generalship. He displayed extreme favoritism in deciding military matters throughout the war, trashing his personal enemies, unreasonably elevating his friends, and even arranging battle plans to fit his prejudices. Such protégés as William Sherman and Philip Sheridan benefitted greatly from this, during their army service and in the post-war struggle for glory. Under Grant’s unjust criticisms (and 150 years of biased and untruthful attacks from his supporters) the reputations of Robert E. Lee, John McClernand, Gouverneur Warren, George Thomas, William Rosecrans, Don Carlos Buell, Jacob Lauman, Joseph Hooker, George Meade, and others have unduly suffered. When an officer whom Grant disliked requested a court of inquiry in order to right a wrong, Grant rarely offered justice.
Many criticisms of Grant’s generalship and character are usually blamed on believers in “the Lost Cause” or on those who admire other commanders. The comprehensive analysis in my book, Grant Under Fire, of primary source material reveals how Grant does not deserve the exalted reputation assigned him by various authors. This unwarranted elevation of Grant across the board—even to the point of approving his exceptionally wretched presidency—is the Civil War’s most persistent myth.