On May 2, 1881, William T. Sherman, the Commanding General of the United States Army, apparently received the Shiloh after-action report of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert A. Fulton of Colonel Jesse Appler’s 53rd Ohio Regiment, and had it forwarded to Colonel Scott (probably for inclusion into the Official Records). He endorsed it as being “substantially correct,” as far as his own memory went.
But why wasn’t this report, dated April 9th, sent to Washington and placed in the army files shortly after the battle? Brigade commander Jesse Hildebrand had mentioned Appler’s report in his own: “The Fifty-third Regiment, after forming in line of battle under my order, fired two rounds, and immediately fell back into the woods. It appears from the report of Colonel Appler that, apprehending a flank movement on his left, he ordered a retreat, but subsequently rallied in the rear of the Eighteenth Illinois.” This description of Appler’s report does not match the report of his subordinate, Fulton, indicating that Appler’s was a completely separate document. As Fulton died in July 1874, it seems strange that his report would turn up in 1881.
The questions remain: What happened to Appler’s report, is Fulton’s report an accurate version, and was Sherman attempting to cover up what happened? Throughout his life, Sherman lied about the surprise, attempted to censor those who stated it as fact (which it was), and criticized those officers, such as Thomas Worthington, who challenged Sherman’s position.
Does anyone have the text of Appler’s report, and are there any other references to it besides Hildebrand’s in the ORs?
And someone apparently prevented Worthington’s report from being submitted, as well. Sherman’s double standard was apparent when Worthington was told by the Compiler of the Rebellion Records (an official under Commanding General Sherman) in 1877, that his report would be excluded from the official reports and treated merely “as one furnished subsequently to supply deficiency in data.” Fulton’s report was treated differently and ended up in the ORs.
But there are a few other things to remember:
1). Sherman was at fault for much of what happened at Shiloh. He ignored repeated warning and a wealth of evidence of an enemy attack. He had ordered or permitted Appler to camp in front of the general line, across a stream, and in an isolated and vulnerable position. Even when he became cognizant of the attack, Sherman failed to pull Appler back, ordered him to remain at all hazards, and vainly promised him support.
2). Although Appler is to blame for running away, as the accounts concur, Sherman used Appler (and the men who ran away, despite their suffering from Sherman’s own wrongdoings) as the scapegoat for what happened. He should have blamed himself on a number of matters.
3). Appler started out well. He was alert to the enemy’s initial advance, and should not be caricatured as merely “nervous.” He took the right steps in response to the enemy’s presence, first forming on his color line, then wheeling to the south as the enemy was marching past his flank, and lastly wheeling back behind his camp when the threat from the enemy to his west grew. His regiment apparently put a very large number of Pat Cleburne’s men (supposedly in just two-plus volleys) hors de combat, which was good work for the day.
4). Strangely, Sherman’s OR, written within days of the events, had him visiting Appler’s position around 7 am, when his orderly was killed, and then it has Sherman come again around 8 am, when he supposedly gave Appler orders to hold the ground at all hazards. Most accounts have all of this activity occurring during the 7 am visit.
Ephraim Dawes of the 53rd Ohio wrote to Kate that “Sherman blames our Regt severely. I think under a misapprehension of the fact.”