To Maurice D’Aoust,
You provide an impressive report, upon completion of an interesting investigation: “How lucky was Grant?”
At the start of the Civil War, Ulysses S. Grant did not think of himself as lucky, but more likely, “under-appreciated.” His early attempts to gain a colonelcy, or possibly a Staff position with McClellan, came to nothing. So, when that June 1861 offer of the 21st Illinois was dangled in front of him, Grant seized the opportunity with both hands, and never looked back.
Everyone with an interest in U.S. Grant is familiar with his Missouri 1861 run-in with Benjamin Prentiss (each man vying for seniority over the other—a dispute which Grant eventually won.) But few are familiar with an earlier incident of a similar nature, when COLONEL Grant of the 21st Illinois was in contention with Colonel Turner of the 15th Illinois (Turner’s date of rank was earlier, but Grant claimed “priority due to Regular Army experience.”) In the end, Grant won the argument and gained the prize: command of the camp which the two regiments occupied, which resulted in de facto brigade command [Army Memoirs of Lucius W. Barber, Co. D, 15th Illinois; Chicago: JMW Jones Co. (1894) page 21.]
What does the above incident reveal? U.S. Grant was able to “make his own luck,” by asserting himself, pushing a claim, and persisting until his claim was accepted as valid. The pay-off versus Colonel Turner was brigade command. Following Grant’s success in the dispute with General Prentiss, the pay-off was “being in the right place, at the right time.” Grant took advantage of an opportunity to take possession of Paducah Kentucky for the Union on 6 September 1861.
Fortune favors the brave. Better to be lucky, than good. You make your own luck. Whichever version was “the luck” attracted to Ulysses S. Grant, he was undoubtedly a worthy beneficiary.
Cheers,
Mike Maxwell
Thanks, Mike.
I can’t independently verify the recollections of Lucius Barber, but it seems to me that Colonel Grant was misreading or intentionally misusing the regulations. Prior service in the regular army was taken into account when establishing the relative rank of officers (although it was done incorrectly in a substantial proportion of the cases, according to Eicher & Eicher). But, when there are two full colonels in the volunteer service, the one who has the earlier date of commission at that grade, as far as I know, would be the ranking officer.
This may not have made much difference in the grand scheme of things, if Grant subsequently received his promotion to brigadier-general in the volunteers. But his failure to win this argument might have caused a wholly different outcome.
I’m not a fan of the phrase, “making one’s own luck.” The fortunes of war are just that: luck. If Grant is to be credited, it could be for knowing the regulations, being a better debater despite the facts, receiving the benefit of Pope’s incorrect conclusion, or just knowing how to blow smoke in the face of or intimidate others.
The full paragraph in Barber’s book is:
“We found the 21st Illinois Regiment Volunteer Infantry here, commanded by Colonel Ulysses S. Grant, afterward the great hero of the War. There was a sharp strife between Colonels Turner and Grant as to which outranked. Turner claimed superiority on account of the date of commission. Grant claimed it on account of having belonged to the regular army, and with his usual pertinacity and Pope’s order, gained his point and assumed command of the camp. The first order he issued was for a detail from the 15th to clean up his regiment’s quarters. It was needed bad enough, but the order did not set well on our stomachs. We had just put our own camp in splendid order and we did not feel like doing the dirty work of his regiment. Luckily for us, Col. Turner was away when the order came and Lieut.-Col. Ellis was in command. He took the order, read it, his face burning with anger, and sent word to Col. Ulysses S. Grant that his regiment did not enlist as “ni–ers” to do the dirty work of his or any other regiment. This emphatic protest brought Col. Grant over at once. High words ensued, which resulted in Lieut.-Col. Ellis tendering Col. Grant his sword, but as for obeying that order, he should never do it. I think Grant must have admired his spirit, as he refused to receive his sword and did not enforce the order. As a natural consequence, the 15th Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry did not fall in love with Grant then, but we surely did with Lieut.-Col. Ellis. We saw the stuff he was made of and the bold stand he took for his own and our rights and we would have followed him to the death if he had so ordered. It was not until Grant had showed great courage, indomitable perseverance and lofty patriotism that we could regard him with any degree of favor.”
Joseph
Thank you for having a look at Lucien Barber’s recollection and including the experience of E.F.W. Ellis — for it is that man’s response to Ulysses S. Grant, attempting to throw his weight, that is the gem of the story. (Unfortunately, the brave and respected LtCol Ellis lost his life during Day One at Shiloh.)
Mike
Thanks for your insights Mike. According to some accounts, Grant actually contemplated declining this less-than-attractive command. See footnote 1 in this regard. As for Grant seizing the opportunity with both hands, so will a starving man reach for a loaf of bread with both hands and by June, 1861, Grant was starving for any command as might be thrown his way.
I never suggested that Grant was not capable of making his own luck. What I did propose was that he got more than his fair share of luck during the Civil War. I think my thesis proves that out if only on the basis of his numerical superiority over his enemies as compared to most Civil War commanders.
I believe that others were much more worthy beneficiaries than Grant was and would have ended the war much sooner had they received a proportionate amount of luck as Grant did and I’m specifically referring to George B. McClellan. If anything, McClellan was one of the unluckiest commanders of the war. Compare each of McClellan’s and Grant’s respective Eastern Theater campaigns carefully and you will see what I mean. When I say compare, I mean compare all aspects including relative strengths of the Union and Confederate armies, the evolution of the vital cavalry arm, the unprecedented supply of men and materiel in 1864 vs. 1862 etc, etc. etc.
You have illustrated instances where Grant made his own luck and I “grant” you those. I have illustrated numerous major instances when Grant did not make his own luck. I am of the firm belief they far outweigh those instances when he did make his own luck.
Respectfully,
Moe Daoust